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Abstract 
The US criminal justice and welfare systems together form important government interventions 
into the lives of the poor. This paper considers how imprisonment is related to welfare receipt for 
offenders and their families.  Using longitudinal data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing 
study, it investigates how recent paternal incarceration is associated with families‟ receipt of TANF, food 
stamps, and Medicaid/SCHIP.  Results robust to multiple tests find that incarceration does not increase 
the likelihood of TANF receipt but significantly increases food stamps and Medicaid/SCHIP receipt. 
Further, the effect of incarceration on welfare receipt is larger than the recent loss of father‟s employment. 
The findings suggest that an unexpected consequence of mass imprisonment is the expansion of 
government regulation through welfare provision for offenders‟ families.  
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A growing body of literature suggests that the US criminal justice and welfare systems together 
form an important government intervention in the lives of the poor.  Considered the right and left hands of 
the state (Bourdieu 1998; Wacquant 2009) or the hard and soft sides of government (Cohen 1985), 
punishment and welfare systems have been jointly studied by theorists and empiricists.  They have been 
variously proposed as tools of the state for social control (Cohen 1985), as strategies for managing social 
insecurity and racial inequality (Wacquant 2009), and as characteristics of broader perspectives for 
governing social marginality (Beckett and Western 2001; Garland 2001).  In conceptual models, the 
retrenchment of welfare provision and the expansion of corrections are caused by a third, debated factor.  
It has been proposed that the developments are the necessary and direct result of neoliberal government 
(Wacquant 2009), the changing response of government and professionals to deviant and non-conformist 
behavior (Cohen 1985), or the products of larger shifts in the philosophies, politics, and public opinion 
about poverty governance (Garland 1987; Mead 1997; Garland 2001; Beckett and Western 2001).  
Drawing from these theories, this paper questions how criminal justice and welfare systems are 
connected at the micro-level of offenders and their families. In doing so, the paper makes two 
contributions to the literature on social control and poverty governance. First, it will show that criminal 
justice and welfare have an important and likely causal direct connection. Second, criminal justice 
involvement is associated with more, rather than less, welfare provision—a relationship that runs counter 
to trends in policy development.   The findings suggest that an unexpected consequence of “mass 
imprisonment” (Garland 2001) is that offenders‟ families also come under the state‟s supervision, albeit 
through its “soft” side of welfare provision rather through the “hard” side of corrections.  
This paper uses longitudinal data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing survey to 
investigate how recent paternal incarceration is related to welfare receipt among families of offenders.  
The following section briefly describes literature on the relationship among criminal justice, welfare, and 
other government institutions, on incarceration and families, and on determinants of welfare receipt.   4 
Section II presents the data, measures, and methods.  Section III describes the results and section IV 
concludes with a discussion of findings, limitations, and suggestions for future research.  
 
I.  Background 
Criminal justice and welfare: modes of state governance 
  Criminal justice and welfare systems have long been considered two institutions that govern 
socially marginal groups.  While the criminal justice system‟s role in managing deviance is explicit, the 
social welfare arms of government can also be viewed as governing non-conformist behavior (Cohen 
1985; Garland 1987; Mead 1997).  In Regulating the Poor (1993), Piven and Cloward posit that the 
contemporary US welfare system manages the behavior of poor people by reinforcing work norms, 
pacifying civil disorder, and ensuring that labor market participation at low wages and dire conditions is 
preferable to receiving government aid.  In the debates leading up to the 1996 welfare reforms, welfare 
policies were portrayed as shaping consequential behaviors and motivations of the poor.  It was argued 
that the permissiveness of welfare policies promoted non-work, crime, and female-headed households 
(Mead 1986), although the evidence underlying these arguments is debatable (Katz 1989).  More recently, 
research suggests that the degrading aspects of welfare policies can negatively affect clients‟ beliefs about 
government responsiveness, willingness to raise grievances against the state, and perceptions of 
citizenship (Soss 2002).  
Dramatic changes in welfare and criminal justice policy over the last three decades have led to a 
growing literature from a diverse group of scholars on the two systems as dual modes of poverty 
governance.  Mead and colleagues (1997) suggests that a new form of paternalism, or the “close 
supervision of a dependent,” characterizes recent government policies towards the poor, including welfare 
reform and criminal justice expansion (1).  Garland (2001) describes a general shift away from 
rehabilitative approaches, which he calls “penal welfarism,” and towards a new culture of control that is 
anti-modern and punitive. Beckett and Western (2001) posit that welfare retrenchment and growth in 
incarceration rates characterize a turn to punitive, state-level policy. Wacquant (2009) proposes that the   5 
work-based reforms of welfare policy and the expansion of criminal justice together form a joint strategy 
of neoliberal government for the management of economically and socially marginal groups.  
Despite this rich literature, we have little understanding on how these two government institutions 
operate in the everyday lives of poor people.  Policies from the 1996 welfare reforms prevent drug-related 
ex-felons from receiving TANF and food stamps in order to ensure that “undeserving” individuals are 
excluded from government assistance (Rubinstein and Mukamal 2002).  Given these restrictions, it is not 
surprising that prior research on maternal incarceration and welfare receipt found little change, and even 
lower rates, of program participation post-incarceration (Butcher and LaLonde 2006).  However, research 
on the individual level misses the gendered character of the institutions, where men make up the majority 
of the incarcerated and women form the bulk of welfare caseloads (Wacquant 2009). Recognizing the 
gendered division, this paper investigates how paternal incarceration affects maternal receipt of welfare in 
poor families.  
 
The costs of incarceration to offenders and their families 
It is not unreasonable to think that paternal incarceration could lead to greater welfare receipt 
among families, as prior research has documented a multitude of ways that criminal justice involvement 
has important and measurable consequences.  The burgeoning of the prison system over the last three 
decades has made incarceration an unavoidable intervention into the lives of many families.  In 2002, 
over 2.4 million children had a mother or father in jail or prison (Mumola 2006).  These figures are even 
higher for particular groups of children because of the concentrated rates of imprisonment among young 
black men. It is estimated that 1 in 4 black children born in 1990 has experienced parental incarceration 
before his or her 18th birthday (Wildeman 2009).    
The prevalence of incarceration has generated research on the link between corrections and other 
institutions. Incarceration is a destabilizing intervention for offenders‟ employment (Pager 2003; Holzer 
et al. 2004) and marriage prospects (Lopoo and Western 2005).  Criminal justice involvement can restrict 
interactions with other government agencies, such as hospitals and schools (Goffman 2009).  The growth   6 
in female imprisonment, combined with welfare retrenchment, has led to recent increases in foster care 
caseloads (Swann and Sylvester 2006).  State policies barring felons and ex-felons from voting have 
changed the outcomes of state and national elections in consequential ways (Manza and Uggen 2006).  
As for incarceration and welfare, there are two main ways that paternal incarceration can 
financially strain families and lead to welfare receipt: loss of resources (including income and in-kind 
services) and incarceration-related costs. As a result of these dual processes, families with paternal 
imprisonment have reported increased material hardship (Schwartz-Soicher et al. 2009). Paternal 
incarceration decreases family income by eliminating paternal income during imprisonment and by 
reducing the amount the family receives after incarceration.  According to a 2004 survey by the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, over half of fathers in prison provided the primary financial support for their families 
(Glaze and Maruschak 2008).  After release, offenders face substantial barriers to finding employment 
(Pager 2003; Holzer et al. 2004).  Fathers are less likely to cohabitate with their families, resulting in 
fewer financial contributions to family income (Geller et al. forthcoming).  Ethnographic studies describe 
fathers providing modest but critical financial support to families prior to imprisonment (Fishman 1990; 
Braman 2004); however, Comfort (2008) found that female partners were often better off financially after 
paternal incarceration. Ethnographies have also described many fathers as regular contributors of in-kind 
resources, such as childcare and other domestic help, which the family loses during paternal 
imprisonment (Fishman 1990; Braman 2004).  
Besides the loss of resources, families also face various costs of criminal justice involvement.  
During imprisonment, families send money and care packages, travel to visit inmates, and accept costly 
collect phone calls; a typical prison collect call costs between one and three dollars a minute (Travis 
2005). Ethnographic accounts describe family members so compelled to bring requested items to their 
partners in prison that the rest of the family had to go without everyday essentials (Fishman 1990; 
LeBlanc 2003; Comfort 2008).  A survey of women visiting prison found that the average monthly cost of 
visiting, calling, and sending packages to their partners was $292 (Grinstead et al. 2001).  After   7 
imprisonment, the imposition of monetary sanctions can be substantial, particularly for already strained 
budgets (Harris et al. 2010).  
 
Factors that determine receipt of TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid/SCHIP 
While evidence generally finds that families face greater financial strain as a result of paternal 
incarceration, a range of factors—not only financial situation—affects a family‟s likelihood of receiving 
welfare benefits.  A family‟s decision to enroll in means-tested welfare programs is complex, based on 
financial need, expectations of future income, ability of extended family networks to provide a safety net, 
and beliefs about the stigma of welfare receipt (Edin and Lein 1996; London et al. 2004). In addition to 
these personal expectations and beliefs, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996 (PRWORA) has also placed greater formal restrictions on eligibility for cash assistance or 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and families must cross many hurdles to apply.  In 
New York, which has one of the most complicated processes, applicants must attend two interviews, have 
a home visit, get fingerprinted, and enroll in up-front work activities in order to begin receiving assistance 
(Holcomb et al. 2003).    Since the 1996 reforms, TANF recipients also face lifetime limits of five years, 
have greater work requirements, and confront stricter sanctions for noncompliance in many states 
(Morgan 2001; Rubinstein and Mukamal 2002).   
At the same time as introducing greater barriers for TANF, PRWORA separated eligibility for 
Medicaid, allowing families to obtain Medicaid without receiving cash assistance (Teitler et al. 2007), 
and states have made concerted efforts to enroll children in the State Children‟s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP), enacted in 1997.  Similar efforts have been made with federally funded food stamp 
programs.  Although there is considerable variation among states, many jurisdictions have multiple 
offices and entry points to enroll families in food stamps and health insurance programs like Medicaid 
and SCHIP in order “to help de-stigmatize these programs and distinguish them from traditional 
„welfare‟” (Holcomb et al. 2003).  Further, the income ceiling to receive TANF is lower compared to food 
stamps and Medicaid/SCHIP, where states allow income above the federal poverty line and usually make   8 
special allowances for families with young children. Because of these changes, recipients of food stamps 
and Medicaid/SCHIP experience fewer stigmas as government dependents or “welfare queens,” labels 
more characteristically associated with cash recipients. 
The likelihood that a family receives TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid/SCHIP depends on a 
variety of program-specific factors, including whether the family‟s household income is low enough to 
qualify for assistance, the family realizes they are eligible, the family believes that the benefits of receipt 
outweigh the costs and decides to apply, and the agency approves the family‟s application. The diversity 
of program-specific factors suggests that the impact of paternal incarceration on family‟s receipt of 
welfare benefits is likely to be different by program—TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid/SCHIP. 
 
II. Data, measures, and methods 
Data  
  To investigate how recent paternal incarceration is related to receipt of welfare benefits, I use data 
from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study (“Fragile Families”).  Fragile Families is a 
longitudinal study of approximately 5,000 children born between 1998 and 2000 to parents in US cities 
with populations over 200,000. The study conducted initial interviews in 20 cities with mothers shortly 
after giving birth, contacted and interviewed fathers, and oversampled non-marital births (for more 
information on study design and sample, see Reichman et al. 2001).  Follow-up interviews were 
conducted with both parents when the child was 1, 3, and 5 years old.  By the 5-year interview, nearly 85 
percent of mothers were still in the survey sample.  
  I primarily rely on information gathered from mothers, beginning with the initial interview at the 
child‟s birth through the 5-year interview, due to the relatively high attrition rate of fathers in the sample. 
I exclude mothers who state that the father is unknown or that the father passed away before the 5-year 
follow up interview.  I also exclude mothers who report that they have been recently incarcerated since 
the effects of maternal incarceration on families are very different from those resulting from paternal   9 
incarceration (Hagan and Dinovitzer 1999). My final sample consists of mothers with complete 
information on all measures at both the 3- and 5-year surveys (N=3,202). 
The Fragile Families data provides a number of strengths for investigating the consequences of 
paternal incarceration for families. A major difficulty with research on families of offenders is that a 
“family” can be defined in various ways.  Because marital status does not fully capture familial 
relationships, particularly for groups that commonly cohabitate rather than marry, administrative records 
or other formal measures are not adequate.
1 Fragile Families data are ideal for this research because they 
provide information on both parents, regardless of marital and relationship status.  
The rich amount of data collected about families and the longitudinal design of the Fragile 
Families survey allow me address concerns of selection bias in two ways.  First, I am able to control for 
many characteristics prior to paternal incarceration that might affect selection, such as living 
arrangements, mother‟s labor market involvement, and prior receipt of social welfare benefits. Second, 
the longitudinal design allows me to use several statistical models—logit with lagged variables and fixed 
effects models—which utilize repeated measures over time for the same families to account for any stable 
differences between families.   
 
Measures 
  Welfare benefits. I investigate a family‟s receipt of TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid/SCHIP. 
For TANF and Medicaid/SCHIP, mothers are asked whether they are currently receiving each of these 
welfare benefits at the 3- and 5-year surveys.  For food stamps, mothers are asked if they have received 
these within the last year. In most logit models, I include variables for each of these measures at the 3-
year survey as control variables (or lagged dependent variables) in order to capture prior knowledge of 
program availability.  Fixed effects models use these measures at both the 3- and 5-year surveys.  
Paternal criminal justice measures.  
Recent paternal incarceration. This measure reflects mother and father‟s reports of whether the 
father was currently incarcerated at the 5-year survey or at any point between the 3- and 5-year surveys.    10 
Prior paternal criminal justice involvement. This is a broad measure of whether the father has 
ever had previous contact with the criminal justice system.  It is based on both mother and father‟s 
reports, and indicates whether the father has ever been stopped by the police for a non-minor traffic 
violation, charged and/or convicted for breaking the law, or experienced time in jail or prison by the 3-
year survey.   
Paternal employment. In some analyses I compare the effect size of recent paternal incarceration 
to recent loss of paternal employment, since job loss may be considered a third factor that leads to both 
incarceration and welfare receipt.  To measure job loss unrelated to incarceration, I create a dummy 
variable for fathers that were employed in year 3 and unemployed in year 5 and did not experience recent 
incarceration.  The measure is based on father and mother reports. 
Material hardship index.  This index is similar to the one used by Schwartz-Soicher et al. in their 
paper on paternal incarceration and material hardship (2009).  It is the sum of five material hardship 
questions that are administered to mothers.  These questions apply to the twelve months prior to the 
survey: did you receive free food or meals? Did you not pay the full amount of rent or mortgage 
payments? Were you evicted from your home or apartment for not paying the rent or mortgage? Did you 
not pay the full amount of a gas, oil, or electricity bill? Was there anyone in your household who needed 
to see a doctor or go to the hospital but couldn‟t go because of the cost?  
Household income. This is a logged measure of mother‟s self-reported total household income. It 
includes multiple sources, such as formal and informal labor market jobs, public assistance, and child 
support, and it is measured before taxes. 
Relationship with father.  Relationship status is measured with three dummy variables for 
married, cohabitating and non-resident fathers.
2 
Presence of a social father. For mothers that are not romantically involved with the father, the 
Fragile Families survey asks about the presence of a new romantic partner. The variable “social father” is 
based on maternal reports that she is either cohabitating or married to a new romantic partner.    11 
Labor market participation. A measure of the mother‟s formal labor market participation (y/n) is 
included to control for any differences between mothers that have recently worked and those that have 
not. 
Total children. This measure of total children in the family includes children by the subject father 
and also by other partners of the mother. I expect that mothers with more children will be more likely to 
receive social welfare services. 
Maternal demographics.  I include maternal demographics, such as age, education attainment, 
race, and citizenship status, which are all measured at the baseline interview. Citizenship status addresses 
any differences in social welfare program participation that are due to eligibility criteria regarding 
nationality.  
City of residence. Dummy variables are included for the city of residence of the mother at the 
baseline interview. Because the receipt of social welfare benefits are influenced by regional factors in a 
variety of ways—for example, policies on TANF and SCHIP eligibility, processes for applying, and 
generosity of TANF—these variables control for differences at the city level. 
 
Methods 
To understand the relationship between recent paternal incarceration and families‟ receipt of 
welfare benefits, I first provide descriptive statistics for families by recent paternal incarceration.  I then 
use logit models with lagged variables and fixed-effects logit models to control for possible confounding 
factors.  Recent paternal incarceration is regressed separately on TANF, food stamps, and 
Medicaid/SCHIP receipt for the full sample of families as well as a sample limited to families with prior 
paternal criminal justice contact. Limiting the sample to those with a prior history of criminal justice 
contact restricts the analysis to families that are more similar to each other compared to the full sample.  
In the limited sample, there may be fewer unobservable factors that could bias findings. These families 
may be considered the most likely to experience the “treatment” of recent paternal incarceration and the 
results may align better with experimental results compared to population based samples.    12 
Logit models include independent variables measured at the 3-year survey and dependent 
variables measured at the 5-year survey.  In most models, I include a lagged dependent variable measured 
at the 3-year survey to capture prior social welfare program participation.  Including the lagged dependent 
variable controls for whether the family had prior knowledge about welfare eligibility and the application 
process as well as any family characteristics that are associated with prior welfare use but are not captured 
by the other independent variables measured at year 3.  
The logit models include a rich set of control variables and limit the sample to those most likely 
to receive the treatment of recent incarceration to better address selection bias concerns; however, they do 
not eliminate the possibility that incarceration and social service receipt are both driven by unobservable 
factors.  There may be unmeasured characteristics that affect a family‟s use of social welfare services and 
the likelihood that the family will experience recent paternal incarceration that are not addressed by 
limiting the sample to those with prior criminal justice contact.  For example, if we believe that there is an 
unobserved factor of general family instability that is correlated with both paternal incarceration and 
social welfare receipt, logit models may not adequately control for this even in the limited sample. To 
adjust for any time-stable, unobserved characteristics, I use fixed effects logit models with limited 
covariates. These models control for unmeasured characteristics that do not change over time but that may 
affect incarceration and family welfare receipt.  I also limit the sample to families with prior paternal 
criminal justice contact to further minimize potential differences between families with a recent paternal 
incarceration and those without. 
While fixed effects models are useful for addressing concerns of time-stable, unmeasured factors, 
such as general family instability, there may still be time-variant, unobserved characteristics that bias 
estimates of paternal incarceration on welfare use.  One possible scenario is that the loss of paternal 
employment leads to both incarceration and to welfare receipt. To address this, I include a dummy 
variable in the logit and fixed effects logit models for fathers who were not incarcerated but became 
unemployed between years 3 and 5 and I compare the incarceration coefficient with the coefficient for 





[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Descriptive characteristics of families, by recent paternal incarceration 
The overlap between welfare participation and criminal justice involvement is high, as families 
that experienced a recent paternal incarceration are more likely to receive TANF, food stamps, and 
Medicaid/SCHIP (see table 1). Twenty percent of families with a recent incarceration were receiving 
TANF, as opposed to ten percent of families without a recent incarceration.  The majority of families with 
an incarceration (69 percent) were receiving food stamps (compared to 35 percent of families without an 
incarceration) and 77 percent were receiving Medicaid or SCHIP (as opposed to 51 percent).  
Considering the independent variables, families that have experienced a recent paternal 
incarceration are different from families without recent incarceration on a variety of observable 
characteristics.  The vast majority of families with a recent incarceration (91 percent) reported prior 
paternal criminal justice involvement (compared to 60 percent).  Families with a recent paternal 
incarceration experience more financially precarious situations, even before paternal incarceration. They 
report lower household income, higher levels of material hardship, and are more likely to receive TANF, 
food stamps, and Medicaid/SCHIP before incarceration, compared to families without recent 
incarceration experiences.  They are also less likely to be married and more likely to have non-resident 
fathers compared to families without a recent paternal incarceration.  Families with a recent paternal 
incarceration were slightly more likely than other families to report having a social father in the 
household at the 3-year survey.   
In terms of maternal demographics, mothers who experienced a recent paternal incarceration 
were more likely to be US citizens, to be younger, have less education, and to be black compared to 
mothers without a recent paternal incarceration.    14 
Families with and without recent paternal incarceration were similar on two observed 
characteristics—total children in the family and mother‟s participation in the formal labor market.  
Families had an average of about 2.5 children and the majority of mothers (nearly 60 percent) reported 
participation in the formal labor market at the 3-year survey. 
 
Recent paternal incarceration and families’ receipt of welfare 
  According to the descriptive statistics above, there are many differences between families that 
experience a recent paternal incarceration and those that do not. Recent incarceration is not a random 
event in the lives of families, and the following analyses aim to account for possible cofounding factors 
that bias estimates of the relationship between incarceration and welfare.   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Tables 2 through 4 describe logit models with welfare receipt outcomes measured in year 5 and 
independent variables measured in year 3.  In a model for TANF receipt (see table 2), recent paternal 
incarceration is significant in a bivariate relationship but is no longer significant after controls are added 
and the sample is limited to families with prior paternal criminal justice contact.  Instead of recent 
incarceration, prior TANF receipt, material hardship, household income, and relationship with father are 
important determinants.  
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
For food stamps receipt, the story is quite different (see table 3).  There is a strong, significant 
association between recent incarceration and food stamps receipt (column 1).  This association diminishes 
slightly in size but remains significant when controls are added (column 2). The logit coefficient of 0.81 
corresponds to an odds ratio of 2.25 times greater likelihood of food stamps receipt following recent 
paternal incarceration.  When the sample is further restricted to families with prior paternal criminal 
justice contact, the logit coefficient on recent incarceration remains unchanged (column 3).  
[Insert Table 4 here]   15 
  The results for Medicaid/SCHIP receipt are similar to those for food stamps (see table 4).  The 
logit model estimates a large and significant association between recent incarceration and 
Medicaid/SCHIP receipt (column 1).  When controls are added, the size diminishes to a logit coefficient 
of 0.51, which corresponds to 1.67 higher odds of receipt for families with recent incarceration.  The odds 
of Medicaid/SCHIP receipt are similar—and even slightly higher—for the sample limited to families with 
prior criminal justice contact (column 3).   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
  While the logit models include a rich set of control variables and are tested on several samples, 
they do not control for time-stable, unobserved characteristics of families that may bias the relationship 
between recent incarceration and welfare receipt. To address this, I present results for TANF, food 
stamps, and Medicaid/SCHIP receipt from fixed-effects logit models (see table 5). These models include 
limited covariates compared to the logit models and account for any unobserved, stable differences 
between families. For TANF, recent paternal incarceration is not related to receipt in both the full sample 
and the sample limited to families with prior paternal criminal justice contact, corresponding to the logit 
findings.  For food stamps, recent incarceration is significantly associated with receipt in the full sample 
(see column 3), corresponding to 1.67 higher odds of receipt.  In the limited sample, the effect size and 
significance level remains virtually unchanged (column 4).  For food stamps, the fixed effects models 
estimate a slightly smaller but still significant effect of recent incarceration compared to the logit models. 
For Medicaid/SCHIP, recent paternal incarceration is marginally significantly related (p=0.054) 
to receipt in the full model (see table 5, column 5). When the sample is restricted to families who are 
more similar—those with prior paternal criminal justice contact—recent incarceration is significantly 
related and the effect size corresponds to the logit estimates reported in Table 4.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
  Figure 1 compares results from the logit and fixed effects logit models for food stamps and 
Medicaid/SCHIP receipt on the limited sample.  The regular logit model estimates 2.24 greater odds of 
food stamps recent for families that experience a recent paternal incarceration, whereas the fixed effects   16 
models estimate 1.68 higher odds.  For Medicaid/SCHIP receipt, logit and fixed effect logit models 
estimate 1.70 and 1.72, respectively, greater odds of receipt for families with a recent paternal 
incarceration.  As the findings show, recent paternal incarceration is not associated with TANF receipt, 
but is significantly related to higher receipt of food stamps and Medicaid/SCHIP.  
  The above analysis provides suggestive evidence that recent paternal incarceration is not only 
significantly associated with food stamps and Medicaid/SCHIP receipt but may also be causally related. 
The use of samples limited to families most similar to each other aimed to minimize unobserved 
differences between families that did and did not experience a recent incarceration.  Fixed effects models 
further account for any time-stable, unobserved differences by considering changes within families rather 
than between families.  However, these models cannot address time-varying covariates that are not 
included in the model.  One potentially relevant covariate is father‟s loss of employment, which could 
lead to the increased likelihood of both imprisonment and welfare receipt. Tables 6 and 7 incorporate a 
dummy variable for fathers who were not recently incarcerated and who lost employment between years 3 
and 5.  For food stamps, the recent incarceration coefficient is large and significant, while loss of 
employment is significant only in the logit, limited sample model (see table 6, column 2). For 
Medicaid/SCHIP, the recent paternal incarceration coefficient is larger compared to the loss of 
employment coefficient in the logit models, and is significant in the fixed effects models (see table 7).  
These findings refute a primary critique against a causal argument—that loss of employment, rather than 
incarceration, accounts for both incarceration and welfare receipt.   
  Taken together, the findings make at least two contributions to existing theory and literature on 
the relationship between criminal justice and welfare systems.  First, results robust to multiple tests show 
that recent paternal incarceration is directly, and likely causally, related to receipt of food stamps and 
Medicaid/SCHIP. Second, the findings suggest that incarceration leads to greater welfare receipt, a 
relationship that runs counter to trends at the state and national levels. 
 
IV. Discussion   17 
This paper investigated whether recent paternal incarceration is associated with families‟ receipt 
of social welfare services, specifically TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid/SCHIP.   Because of 
differences among means-tested programs, I considered the effect of recent paternal incarceration 
separately for each type of government benefit.  For TANF, logit and fixed effects logit models estimated 
a non-significant association between recent paternal incarceration and receipt. In contrast, models predict 
a large, significant effect of recent paternal incarceration on a family‟s likelihood of both food stamps and 
Medicaid/SCHIP receipt.  For food stamps, the odds of a family receiving benefits are between 1.7 times 
(for fixed effects) and 2.2 times (for logit) greater than the odds for a similar family than has not 
experienced recent paternal incarceration.  For Medicaid/SCHIP, the odds of a family receiving benefits 
are about 1.7 times greater (for logit and fixed effects models).  The effect of a recent incarceration on 
food stamps and Medicaid/SCHIP receipt is larger than the effect of loss of employment.  
It is not surprising that recent paternal incarceration has different impacts on a family‟s receipt of 
welfare benefits, depending on the program.  As discussed earlier, TANF, food stamps, and 
Medicaid/SCHIP vary on numerous program-specific factors, including income eligibility thresholds, 
enrollment process, work requirements, time limits for receipt, and stigma of receipt.   The inclusion of 
city-level dummy variables attempts to account for regional level variation but program-specific factors 
still differentiate TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid/SCHIP in consequential ways.    
This paper contributes the first estimates of the effect of recent paternal incarceration on a 
family‟s receipt of social welfare benefits; however, there are limitations that the reader should keep in 
mind.  First, it is likely that some fathers that experience incarceration have multiple children by different 
partners and thus have more than one nuclear family.  In these cases, analysis using Fragile Families data 
may underestimate the effects to all families of offenders and may perhaps be viewed as a lower bound 
estimate of social welfare participation.  
Second, the measure of recent paternal incarceration is dichotomous and it is likely that welfare 
receipt depends on finer characteristics of recent paternal incarceration, such as the length, frequency, and 
type of conviction, which are not reliably available. While the definition of a recent paternal incarceration   18 
between survey years 3 and 5 necessarily limits the length of incarceration to two years, the data cannot 
reliably distinguish length of stay.  It is also likely that other related factors, such as the distance between 
a family‟s residence and father‟s prison, matter to the costs of communication. Unfortunately, this 
information is not available.  
Finally, paternal incarceration is not a random event, and it is possible that unobserved changes to 
the family could impact both the likelihood of incarceration and receipt of benefits.  The paper has 
employed several approaches to account for this possibility—the incorporation of a rich set of control 
variables in the logit models, the utilization of fixed effects logit models, the limited sample, and the 
inclusion of father‟s employment; however, it is not able to address all scenarios that could possibly be 
correlated with both recent paternal incarceration and welfare receipt.  
Despite these limitations, these findings specify an important relationship between incarceration 
and welfare at level of offenders and their families. The expansion of incarceration has not just widened 
state intervention for offenders but has also unintentionally shaped the lives of poor families by increasing 
state intervention through the soft side of welfare provision.  
In the era of post-welfare reform, food stamps and Medicaid/SCHIP provide critical resources for 
poor families and entail the least punitive policies and procedures for receipt. While these benefits serve 
as important safety nets for needy families, the transition to government assistance does not come without 
costs.  To the extent that the incarceration of a family member pushes families across this dependency 
threshold, they become subjects to the disciplinary sanctions, incentive structures, and surveillance 
techniques that shape post-welfare reform (Gustafson 2009).  Scholars further suggest that participation in 
means-tested government programs entails social stigma (Katz 1996) and degrade a person‟s experience 
of citizenship (Morgan 2001; Soss 2002).  While it is important to emphasize that these benefits funnel 
critical assistance to poor families, it is also necessary to underscore the ramifications of greater 
government intervention.  
The study of welfare receipt is particularly timely given recent debates about the financial costs 
and sustainability of expanding criminal justice systems.  This paper suggests that the correctional   19 
system—and particularly imprisonment—is an even more costly policy intervention than originally 
considered. Imprisonment not only requires direct costs of incapacitating offenders but also creates 
greater costs to taxpayers and government for the provision of social welfare programs for families of 
offenders.  This is a revision of Elliot Currie‟s original premise, which proposed that the US saves money 
on welfare and spends on corrections to address the consequences of joblessness (1985).  This paper 
suggests that the United States pays twice—once for incarceration and second for the unintended need for 
welfare among families of offenders. Even when faced with constricted budgets, most states have 
continually increased their prison populations while tightening expenditures for other programs and 
services (Jacobson 2005). With the recent economic downturn and state budgets increasingly in the red, 
policymakers must begin to consider these unintended costs of incarceration in budget calculations of 






1 According to a 2000 Bureau of Justice Statistics survey, less than one-quarter of parents in state prison were 
married. 
2 A broader measure of paternal involvement was used in prior analyses, which included residency and financial 
contributions (such as formal and informal child support payments), but was replaced by this measure, as it is more 
readily interpretable.  An alternate measure, which included in-kind services such as full-time childcare was also 
utilized, but eventually excluded from the analysis because of lack of statistical significance.   20 
 
Table 1: Means and standard deviations, by recent paternal incarceration 
Variable
Dependent variables (measured at 5 years)
TANF receipt 0.20 (0.40) 0.10 (0.30)
Food stamps receipt 0.69 (0.46) 0.35 (0.48)
Medicaid/SCHIP receipt 0.77 (0.42) 0.51 (0.50)
Recent loss of father's employment and no incarceration --- --- 0.07 (0.26)
Independent variables (measured at 3 years)
Prior paternal criminal justice involvement (yr 3 or earlier) 0.91 (0.29) 0.60 (0.49)
TANF receipt 0.24 (0.43) 0.12 (0.33)
Food stamps receipt 0.60 (0.49) 0.35 (0.48)
Medicaid/SCHIP receipt 0.77 (0.42) 0.55 (0.50)
Material hardship index 0.75 (1.04) 0.50 (0.85)
Household income (logged) 9.54 (1.07) 10.10 (1.12)
Relationship with father
Married 0.13 --- 0.38 ---
Cohabiting 0.22 --- 0.21 ---
Non-resident 0.65 --- 0.41 ---
Presence of a social father in household 0.12 (0.33) 0.08 (0.27)
Participation in formal labor market (y/n) 0.55 (0.50) 0.58 (0.49)
Total children 2.58 (1.50) 2.45 (1.40)
Maternal demographics
Age (in years) 25.74 (5.38) 28.66 (6.07)
Education
Some HS or less 0.39 --- 0.28 ---
HS graduate or equivalent 0.37 --- 0.31 ---
Some college  0.22 --- 0.27 ---
College graduate 0.01 --- 0.14 ---
Race
Black, non-Hispanic 0.62 --- 0.47 ---
White, non-Hispanic 0.16 --- 0.25 ---
Hispanic 0.20 --- 0.24 ---
Other 0.03 --- 0.04 ---
US citizen 0.98 (0.14) 0.91 (0.28)
N
Recent incarceration No recent incarceration
388 2814  
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Table 2: Logit model for TANF receipt 
Recent paternal incarceration 0.77 (0.14)*** 0.20 (0.17) 0.15 (0.18)
Prior paternal criminal justice contact 0.37 (0.16)*
Prior TANF receipt 1.43 (0.15)*** 1.39 (0.16)***
Material hardship index 0.17 (0.07)** 0.17 (0.07)*
Household income (logged) -0.40 (0.07)*** -0.39 (0.07)***
Relationship with father (non-resident reference)
Married -0.73 (0.22)*** -0.62 (0.25)*
Cohabiting -0.19 (0.17) -0.17 (0.18)
Presence of a social father in household -0.40 (0.22) -0.47 (0.25)
Participation in formal labor market (y/n) -0.21 (0.15) -0.16 (0.16)
Total children 0.09 (0.05) 0.09 (0.05)
US citizen 0.96 (0.37)** 0.64 (0.42)
Maternal demographics
Age (in years) -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02)
Education (less than HS reference)
HS graduate or equivalent -0.18 (0.15) -0.10 (0.17)
Some college  -0.50 (0.20)* -0.45 ().23)*
College graduate -1.89 (0.75)* -1.82 (1.04)
Race (white, non-Hispanic reference)
Black, non-Hispanic 0.10 (0.22) 0.11 (0.25)
Hispanic 0.06 (0.28) 0.16 (0.31)
Other 0.60 (0.41) 0.61 (0.52)
Constant -2.19 (0.06)*** 1.21 (0.85) 1.98 (0.97)*
Dummy variables for city of residence
Limited sample:                                                     
prior paternal criminal justice contact
N
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
(1) (2) (3)                   
---
√ √
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Table 3: Logit model for food stamps receipt 
 
Recent paternal incarceration 1.38 (0.12)*** 0.81 (0.15)*** 0.81 (0.16)***
Prior paternal criminal justice contact 0.12 (0.11)
Prior food stamps receipt 1.66 (0.11)*** 1.50 (0.13)***
Material hardship index 0.21 (0.06)*** 0.20 (0.07)**
Household income (logged) -0.29 (0.06)*** -0.28 (0.07)***
Relationship with father (non-resident reference)
Married -0.82 (0.14)*** -0.84 (0.17)***
Cohabiting -0.29 (0.13)* -0.23 (0.15)
Presence of a social father in household -0.31 (0.17) -0.43 (0.19)*
Participation in formal labor market (y/n) -0.43 (0.11)*** -0.51 (0.13)***
Total children 0.20 (0.04)*** 0.23 (0.05)***
US citizen 0.67 (0.23)** 0.74 (0.32)*
Maternal demographics
Age (in years) -0.04 (0.01)*** -0.05 (0.01)***
Education (less than HS reference)
HS graduate or equivalent -0.19 (0.12) -0.14 (0.14)
Some college  -0.70 (0.14)*** -0.69 (0.17)***
College graduate -1.68 ().34)*** -1.60 (0.47)***
Race (white, non-Hispanic reference)
Black, non-Hispanic 0.36 (0.15)* 0.32 (0.18)
Hispanic 0.13 (0.18) 0.04 (0.22)
Other 0.01 (0.33) 0.35 (0.42)
Constant -0.60 (0.04)*** 2.01 (0.69)** 2.59 (0.83)**
Dummy variables for city of residence
Limited sample:                                                     
prior paternal criminal justice contact
N
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 4: Logit model for Medicaid/SCHIP receipt 
 
Recent paternal incarceration 1.15 (0.13)*** 0.51 (0.15)*** 0.53 (0.16)***
Prior paternal criminal justice contact -0.02 (0.11)
Prior Medicaid/SCHIP receipt 1.68 (0.10)*** 1.78 (0.13)***
Material hardship index 0.23 (0.06)*** 0.19 (0.07)**
Household income (logged) -0.32 (0.06)*** -0.31 (0.07)***
Relationship with father (non-resident reference)
Married -0.65 (0.13)*** -0.60 (0.16)***
Cohabiting -0.05 (0.13) -0.12 (0.15)
Presence of a social father in household -0.11 (0.18) -0.22 (0.20)
Participation in formal labor market (y/n) -0.55 (0.10)*** -0.50 (0.13)***
Total children 0.21 (0.04)*** 0.23 (0.05)***
US citizen -0.33 (0.19) -0.32 (0.28)
Maternal demographics
Age (in years) -0.03 (0.01)*** -0.04 (0.01)**
Education (less than HS reference)
HS graduate or equivalent -0.24 (0.12) -0.02 (0.15)
Some college  -0.54 (0.14)*** -0.38 (0.17)*
College graduate -1.22 (0.23)*** -1.19 (0.34)***
Race (white, non-Hispanic reference)
Black, non-Hispanic 0.20 (0.14) 0.05 (0.18)
Hispanic 0.24 (0.17) 0.06 (0.21)
Other -0.02 (0.29) 0.03 (0.40)
Constant 0.03 (0.04) 3.80 (0.70)*** 3.58 (0.88)***
Dummy variables for city of residence
Limited sample:                                                     
prior paternal criminal justice contact
N
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001






 Table 5: Fixed-effects logit model for TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid/SCHIP receipt 
 
Recent paternal incarceration -0.03 (0.26) -0.13 (0.28) 0.51 (0.21)* 0.52 (0.22)* 0.46 (0.24) 0.54 (0.26)*
Relationship with father (non-resident 
reference)
Married -1.32 (0.48)** -1.53 (0.57)** -0.72 (0.26)** -0.45 (0.30) -0.35 (0.26) -0.23 (0.32)
Cohabiting -0.36 (0.31) -0.37 (0.34) -0.47 (0.23)* -0.35 (0.26) -0.23 (0.21) -0.38 (0.25)
Participation in formal labor market (y/n) -1.45 (0.19)*** -1.65 (0.23)*** -0.81 (0.15)*** -0.71 (0.18)*** -0.65 (0.14)*** -0.52 (0.18)**
Total children 0.62 (0.17)*** 0.65 (0.19)*** 0.37 (0.13)** 0.65 (0.17)*** 0.19 (0.11) 0.39 (0.15)*
Age (in years) -0.27 (0.06)*** -0.26 (0.08)*** 0.01 (0.04) -0.05 (0.05) -0.21 (0.04)*** -0.32 (0.06)***
Limited sample:                                                 
prior paternal criminal justice contact











 Figure 1: Odds ratio of food stamps and Medicaid/SCHIP receipt for families with a recent 













Fixed effectsTable 6: Recent incarceration and loss of employment on food stamps receipt, logit and fixed effects 
logit models 
 
Recent paternal incarceration 0.83 (0.15)*** 0.86 (0.16)*** 0.50 (0.22)* 0.56 (0.23)*
Recent loss of employment 0.27 (0.19) 0.55 (0.23)* -0.13 (0.36) 0.48 (0.43)
Controls




√* denotes limited controls, including relationship with father, total children, mother's participation in the formal 
labor market, and mother's age.
√ denotes the full set of controls, including prior criminal justice contact, prior welfare receipt, material hardship 
index, logged household income, relationship to father, total children, presence of social father in the household, 
mother's participation in the formal labor market, citizenship, age, race, education, and city dummies
3202 2043 621 461
Models include a dummy variable to account for missing data for father's employment.  This coefficient is non-
significant and not reported in the table.
√ √ √* √*
√ √
logit FE
(1) (2) (3)                   (4)
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Table 7: Recent incarceration and loss of employment on Medicaid/SCHIP receipt, logit and fixed 
effects logit models 
 
Recent paternal incarceration 0.55 (0.15)*** 0.58 (0.16)*** 0.51 (0.24)* 0.60 (0.26)*
Recent loss of employment 0.41 (0.20)* 0.51 (0.25)* 0.64 (0.35) 0.93 (0.48)
Controls




√* denotes limited controls, including relationship with father, total children, mother's participation in the formal 
labor market, and mother's age.
√ denotes the full set of controls, including prior criminal justice contact, prior welfare receipt, material hardship 
index, logged household income, relationship to father, total children, presence of social father in the household, 
mother's participation in the formal labor market, citizenship, age, race, education, and city dummies
√ √ √* √*
√ √
3202 2043 665 420
Models include a dummy variable to account for missing data.  This coefficient is non-significant and not 
reported in the table.
logit FE
(1) (2) (3)                   (4)
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